Five years ago, the collapse of a landmark cold war arms treaty opened a Pandora’s box, unleashing missile-shaped furies that have struck Ukraine. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended when the US withdrew, citing Russian violations dating back to 2014 under Vladimir Putin. While abandoning the treaty aligned with the first Trump administration’s broader opposition to arms control, continuing to pressure Mr Putin into compliance would have been the wiser course.
Targeting Kyiv’s forces are the hypersonic Oreshnik missile and the ballistic Iskander missile. Both can carry a nuclear warhead and would have been barred under the INF treaty. These weapons signal an alarming return to cold war-style tit-for‑tat posturing, with great powers ramping up their military capabilities. Their use highlights Moscow’s accelerated missile development. But it also raises questions about the implications of a nuclear-tipped Oreshnik missile – capable of striking European capitals within 12 to 16 minutes – for Nato security.
The deployment of such missiles exposes the risks of abandoning arms control. The cold war INF treaty, banning ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500km and 5,500km, curbed nuclear escalation in Europe. Its lapse, as the UN warned, removed “an invaluable brake on nuclear war”. History offers lessons. In 1983, US plans to station such missiles in Europe – including Britain – sparked mass protests. Tensions peaked that year during the “Able Archer” drill, misread by Moscow as nuclear war preparation. Alarmed, Ronald Reagan eased fears, leading to the INF treaty and broader arms reductions.
Unlike Mr Reagan, the US president-elect lacks interest in such statesmanship. Mr Putin, more insecure than his Soviet predecessors, embraces brinkmanship, recently lowering Russia’s threshold for nuclear use. Under Barack Obama, arms control advanced with Russia’s then leader Dmitry Medvedev, who signed the New Start treaty limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads. But Mr Putin’s 2012 return to power froze progress on a follow-up deal.
One reason for American indifference to preserving the INF treaty was its irrelevance to China, which was not a signatory and had developed intermediate-range missiles. This may also explain why the Biden administration maintained Mr Trump’s approach, investing significantly in nuclear arms. This shift freed the US to develop weapons aimed at defending Taiwan from a potential Chinese invasion. In Europe, the US also announced plans to deploy long-range weapons in Germany by 2026, followed swiftly by continental powers unveiling plans for “deep-fire” capabilities.
The looming end of the New Start treaty in 2026 demands urgent cooperation between Moscow and Washington to prevent an arms race. Despite the US president-elect’s apparent rapport with Mr Putin, deep-rooted mistrust poses significant hurdles to new arms control talks. To avoid repeating history’s mistakes, western leaders should prioritise negotiations with both Russia and China. A nuclear weapons build-up, with its heightened risks of accidents and catastrophic conflict, is an existential threat of unparalleled immediacy. Without swift action, unchecked competition will overshadow any strategic gains from military posturing.
